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I. Introduction 
Most European nations have some form of legislation relating to plant 
closings or large scale layoffs.1 Typically they call for advance notice 
~by employers and for employer negotiations with employees and government 
over whether the closing can be averted. Often they require severance pay 
for displaced workers and some, for example Sweden, have detailed programs 
of labor market services (retraining, placement, public works, wage 
subsidies) to facilitate adjustments. In Canada, both federal and 
provincial legislation similarly require advance notice. In many of these 
countries small establishments with less than one hundred employees are 
exempt from the requirements, perhaps due to the greater failure rate of 
small businesses or the belief that a shutdown of a small business does 
not have a substantial effect on a community. 
Plant closing legislation in the United States is much more modest. 
As of early 1988, there is no federal law and only a few state laws. 
Three states, Maine, Wisconsin and Hawaii, require advance notice of plant 
shutdowns or large scale layoffs (with size class exemptions), and Maine 
also requires one week's severance pay per year of service for workers 
with greater than three years' tenure. The penalties for noncompliance 
are low in Maine (9500 per establishment) and Wisconsin <950 per 
employee), but high in Hawaii (three months wages and benefits per laid 
off worker). Connecticut does not require advance notice, but does 
require nonbankrupt firms to maintain health insurance and other benefits 
for workers unemployed by plant shutdowns for up to 120 days. 
Massachusetts, Maryland and Michigan all have voluntary programs in which 
firms are urged to provide advance notice and/or continue benefits. 
Finally, South Carolina requires employees to give workers two weeks 
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notice before shutting down, but only In situations whert employees are 
required to give similar notice prior to quitting. 
Interest In plant closing legislation In the United States has grown 
since the deep recession of the mid-1970s and the relatively large number 
of plant closings and permanent layoffs in major manufacturing industries 
since then, undoubtedly stimulated this interest. During the 1975-83 
period over 125 bills relating to plant closings were introduced in 30 
slates; the majority In the northeast and midwest. More than 90 percent 
of these bills had provisions requiring advance notice of shutdowns, while 
substantially smaller percentages'required severance pay or economic 
assistance to either workers, employers, local governments, or potential 
buyers. 
At the federal level, over 40 bills have been introduced into 
Congress since 1979. In April of 1988, Congress voted to include an 
amendment In the omnibus trade bill that would have required employers of 
100 or mere workers to give 60 days advance notice to workers and local 
government officials of a plant closing, or a layoff that was planned to 
last at least six months that involved at least 500 workers or one-third 
of the employer's workforce. Numerous exemptions were included In this 
bill that was vetoed by President Peagan. 
Proponents of advance notice legislation argue that advance notice 
provisions will ease displaced workers' shock and facilitate their search 
for alternative sources of employment or training. Such notice also 
allows employers, workers and the community to see if ways exist to save 
the jobs, such as wage concessions, tax concessions, or seeking new 
ownership, Including the possibility of employee ownership.2 
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Opponents of the legislation argue that, In addition to restricting 
the free mobility of capital, advance notice legislation would have a 
number of other adverse effects on firms. They claim It would increase 
worker turnover and decrease productivity, as those productive workers 
with the best opportunities elsewhere would leave and the morale of 
remaining workers would suffer. It also would decrease the likelihood 
that buyers of the plant's product would place new orders, that banks 
would supply new credit, that suppliers would continue to provide 
services, and that the firm could sell the plant to potential buyers. 
Finally, it would depress corporate stock prices. Such a provision, as 
well as others that, directly increase the costs of plant shutdowns, 
effectively increase the cost of reducing employment and thus should 
encourage firms not to expand operation or to substitute overtime hours 
for additional employment in states where such laws are in effect. 
In evaluating the case for advance notice legislation, it is useful 
to stress the divergence between private and social costs. Qnployers 
currently do not bear the full social costs of plant shutdowns, both 
because unemployment insurance is imperfectly experience rated and because 
the costs these actions impose on communities are not taken Into account 
by them. As such, imposing a "tax" on plant closings, or large scale 
layoffs, either in the form of advance notice provisions, severance pay 
requirements, or maintenance of benefits requirements would offset the 
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difference between the social and private costs of plant closings. These 
efficiency considerations suggest the need for federal, rather than state-by-
state rules, to reduce the possibility that locational decisions by firms would 
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be Influenced by "tax price* differences. Critics, however, would stress 
that such legislation night encourage the flight of jobs overseas. 
In spite of the growth of legislative efforts, there has been 
surprisingly little effort devoted to analyzing what the effects are of 
existing plant closing legislation, of provisions in privately negotiated 
collective bargaining agreements that provide for advance notice in case 
of plant shutdowns and/or layoffs, and of voluntary employer provision of 
advance notice. The next section summarizes what pravious studies have 
found, while section III briefly discusses our own research. Some 
concluding remarks appear in section IV. 
II. MMMn5^Msli£&-2zmlsisas^&il^l 
Lazear (1987) used annual aggregate data for twenty-three countries 
over a 29 year period (1956 to 1984) to estimate what the affects of 
legally mandated severance pay and advance notice provisions for blue-
collar workers were on the aggregate employment/population ratio, 
unemployment rate, and average weekly hours in manufacturing. Simple 
fixed-effects models Cto control for country-specific omitted variables) 
were estimated and a snail set of control variables (e.g., a linear time 
trend, cyclical factors, demographic factors) were included in the 
analysis. He found that instituting an advance notice requirement of 60 
days <2 months), ceteris paribus, would decrease the employment/population 
ratio by about .003 {the U.S. average was .40 during the period), and 
increase average weekly hours by about 0.7, although these effects were 
not statistically significantly different from zero. He argued that 
apparently advance notice requirements encourage employers to substitute 
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additional hours for additional employment! they act like a quasi-fixed 
cost of expanding employment. One must caution, however, that in most 
-countries in Lazear's sample, changes occurred in these requirements only 
once or twice during the period. Hence, the effects he attributed to 
advance notice legislation may In actuality reflect only nonlinear trends. 
Folbre, Leighton and Roderick (1984) is the only study of U.S. data 
that examined the effects of advance notice of plant closings on local 
area unemployment rates and labor force size. They examined the effects 
of major plant closings (those involving more than 100 workers) In Maine 
in the period prior to advance notice becoming mandatory in the state, and 
found that saiimiao. provision by a firm of at least one month's advance 
notice to displaced workers significantly diminished the closing's impact 
on the local area unemployment rate in the month of closing. While this 
may. reflect more rapid reemployment of displaced workers In the presence 
of advance notice, their results also suggest that advance notice was 
associated with a significant reduction in the size of the local labor 
force in the month of the closing. The latter reflects either labor force 
withdrawal or outmigration (and possible reemployment elsewhere); they are 
unable to ascertain which occurred. 
Another study, Weber and Taylor (1963), focused on 32 plant closings 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s and found that voluntarily provided 
advance notice rarely led to increased quit rates or decreased 
productivity of workers. Still a third study, Ho Sen, Jehn, and Trost 
(1981) studied the experiences of 9,500 displaced workers from 42 plants 
that closed and found that provision of advance notice was associated with 
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•iaraer earnings losses for the diaplaced workers; at first glance a 
somewhat paradoxical result. 
In each of the latter three studies (and most of those discussed 
"below) provision of advance notice was treated as exogenous and this may 
bias the authors' estimates of the policy's effects. For example, those 
employers who perceive they would face increased quit rates prior to the 
shutdown date if they provide their workers with advance notice, may not 
provide notice, while those employers «ho perceive they would not face 
increased turnover may do so. To the extent that these perceptions are 
correct, only low 'expected increase in turnover" firms would provide_ 
notice and one would not" observe increased turnover in these firms after" 
notice" was provided (Weber and Taylor's finding).' However, "this would not 
tell us anything about the affects of mandated advance notice. Similarly, 
if advance notice were to arise primarily in situations in which the 
employment prospects faced by displaced workers were the worst, a 
comparison of the earnings losses suffered by workers with notice to the 
tosses incurred by those who failed to receive notice would show that the 
former lost more (Holer,, et al.'s results). However, this would not Imply 
that legally mandated advance notice would make workers worse off. 
Recently several studies have analyzed data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics January 1964 SsuaaLfltJUaElififilJio^ <Sffi). a supplement to 
the ft,rr>nt Population. SumsY. <s« Flaln and Sehgal (1985)). The S S is a 
special supplement to a national probability sample of households that was 
administered to workers permanently displaced during the 1979-84 period 
due to a Plant shutdown or layoff and it contains Information on whether 
the individuals received advance notice or expected their displacement. 
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It contains no Information on whether the notice was formal or how far In 
advance It was given. This Is a crucial omission, since the effectiveness 
of advance notice policies presumably depend at least partially on how far 
in advance notice Is given. 
The various studies yield somewhat mixed findings. Howl and 
Cforthcomlng, 1988) limited her analyses to a small subsampie of the 
displaced workers located In SMSA's who had been displaced from 
manufacturing jobs due to a plant shutdown. She found that on average 
displaced workers who received advance notice did not benefit from the 
advance notice, although white-collar workers did appear to have shorter 
durations of noriemployme'nt. In addition, the approximately 10 percent of 
workers who received advance notice who then quit prior to displacement 
appeared to suffer smaller wage losses and fewer weeks of nonemployment. 
Addison and Pedro (1986; 1987a) concentrated their attention on 
workers displaced due to plant shutdowns and found that, ceteris paribus, 
the presence of advance notice was associated with durations of 
nonemployment that were some 35 percent shorter. For workers who received 
unemployment insurance CUD after displacement (which meant, given UI 
rules in most states, those with more than one week of unemployment) the 
negative association of advance notice and duration was found only for 
white-collar employees. For both white and blue-collar workers who failed 
to receive UI after displacement, a negative association between advance 
notice and duration of nonemployment was found. This latter result is not 
surprising; if advance notice helps some workers to find employment 
without an intervening spell of unemployment, these workers will never be 
eligible for UI benefits. Put another way, the presence of advance notice 
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may Increase the probability that displaced workers fall to receive UI. 
While Addison and Pedro C1986) treated the receipt of UI as endogenous 
_they did not allow advance notice to Influence It, 
Podgursky and Swaim <198?a) restricted their attention to those 
workers displaced during the 1979-81 period. Using a slighly different 
set of control variables than Addison and Pedro <!98?a) they found that 
advance notice significantly reduced nonempioyment durations only for 
white-collar females. Podgursky and Swaim (1987b) studied the 
determinants of post-displacement earnings for workers who were 
subsequently employed full-time at the survey date. They found no effects 
of advance notice, suggesting that such, policies have, at best, 
transitional effects. 
Finally, Addison and Portugal (1987b> found that a 10 percent 
increase in duration of unemployment decreased post-displacement wages by 
about 1 percent. Since their results in this paper (which focused on laid 
off displaced workers, as well as those displaced by piant closings) also 
indicate that advance notice reduced duration of unemployment by about 25 
percent, one can infer that advance notice increases post-displacement 
wages by about 2.5 percent. One must caution, however, that their 
estimated duration-wage relationship is conditional on a displaced 
worker's having remained in the same industry and occupation and they did 
not permit advance notice to have a direct effect on post-displacement 
wages. 
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III. Our Own Research 
Our own research, to be reported in detail in a forthcoming Upjohn 
Institute monograph, reanalyzes the SIM data making a number of 
methodological innovations. First, In the absence of formal legislation 
requiring advance notice, one can view advance notice as an explicit or 
implicit contract provision snd ask if workers must pay for this provision 
in the form of lower predisplacement wages? That is, we ask if 
compensating wage differentials exist for advance notice provisions? If 
the answer is yes, it is straightforward to show that people who receive 
advance notice will appear, ceteris paribus, to suffer smaller earnings 
losses, even if advance notice has no true effect on post-displacement 
wages. 
Second, as noted above, the presence of an advance notice provision 
is likely endogenous and depends upon both employers' willingness to 
supply and employee demand for such provisions. We attempt to formally 
model the determinants of advance notice, including the magnitude of the 
compensating wage differential, and then test if treating advance notice 
as endogenous influences subsequent results. 
Third, previous researchers have not stressed that about 10 percent 
of the males and over 15 percent of the females in the £EW suffered na 
spell of nonemployment after displacement. We estimate separately what 
the effect of advance notice was on the probability of a displaced 
worker's finding a job without any spell of nonemployment and what it was 
on the duration of nonemployment (conditional on a spell existing). We 
also estimate what the effects of advance notice were on survey date 
wages. 
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fourth, since the SIS contains data on whether workers who received 
advance notice quit prior to displacement, m estimate the determinants of 
-predisplacement turnover and ascertain If there Is any evidence that 
turnover araong firms' most productive workers occurs. Finally, all of our 
analyses are done separately for four groups (male/shutdown, 
female/shutdown, male/layoff, female/layoff) to see if such policies have 
differentia! affects across groups. 
Our results indicate that there is very little evidence that workers 
who receive advance notice pay for it in the form of iower predisplaceinerit 
wages. They also suggest that lt"is difficult to explain which displaced 
workers receive advance notice prior to displacement using data on 
characteristics of the individuals, data on characteristics of the 
workforce in the industries in which they were employed, and data on 
employment growth and unemployment in the areas and areas/industries in 
which they were employed. While some variables prove significant in 
formal problt models of the probability of receiving advance notice Cand 
the equations do have some predictive power), in the main few consistent, 
patterns are observed across the four groups. These results, together 
with the results of exogeneity tests we performed, suggest that analyses 
of the effects of advance notice provisions that use the gQK £an 
legitimately treat the existence of advance notice as exogenous. 
Our analyses do suggest that having advance notice does significantly 
increase the probability that a displaced worker will experience no. spell 
of nonemployroent. The largest increase is for males displaced due to a 
shutdown and the major beneficiaries within this group are white-collar 
workers. In contrast, once an individual experiences any nonemployment, 
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the presence of advance notice has no effect on the ultimate total 
duration of reemployment. 4 Advance notice thus seems to help displaced 
^workers in the SUM sample only if the individuals can find employment 
prior to displacement.5 
Analyses of the effects of advance notice on survey data earnings 
echo the findings of Podursky and Swaim C198?b) that, on average, receipt 
of advance notice has no affect on subsequent earnings once reemployed, 
Only for white-collar females who had been displaced-due to a layoff was 
there any evidence that advance notice leads to higher survey data weekly 
earnings and this group makes, up less than 15 percent of the SIM sample. 
The major effect of advance notice on workers in the £QW sample then is 
through decreasing the probability of observing positive nonemployment 
spel1 lengths. 
Finally, for the people in the 52M sample who receive advance notice, 
we find no systematic evidence that observed variables that might be 
proxies for productivity (job tenure, age, education, previous earnings) 
systematically are associated with the probability that a worker will quit 
prior to displacement. Thus, we find no evidence that advance notice will 
lead a firm's most productive workers to quit, thereby disrupting a firm's 
operations in its final weeks. 
iv. Condi/ding.RciMiiJsa 
h number of studies suggest that there are large private costs of 
displacement to displaced workers but that these costs are oftn transitory 
in nature. While some fraction of these costs may represent the 
dissipation of rents, a substantial part represents true social costs 
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(Hamermesh <198?>). Often these costs are transitory In nature — witness 
the fact that earnings of displaced workers in the Sffl * c were reemployed 
_at the survey date were, on average within 5 percent of their predis-
placement earnings. However, some costs are long-lasting; many people In 
the S S were not reemployed at the survey date. 
Our own research and the literature surveyed above suggests that 
advance notice may veil facilitate labor market adjustments by allowing 
displaced workers to find employment prior to their date of displacement. 
Advance notice appears to reduce the probability that displaced workers 
suffer any-spell of nonemployment and thus also may well- moderate 
temporary Increases in area unemployment, rates. In both a number of the 
surveyed studies, and our own, "advance notice" included notice of very 
short duration and thus their results may understate the effects of 
mandated notice of longer duration. The individual worker based data used 
in all of the underlying studies also did not permit analyses of whether 
advance notice of pending displacements can lead to actions (e.g., 
reorganization, wage concessions, employee ownership) that help avert 
displacements. 
Although opponents of advance notice cite potential costs of such 
policies, empirical studies have found no evidence that advance notice 
causes firms' most productive workers to leave and that the productivity 
of the remaining workers suffers. Moreover, save for Lazear (1987), which 
we have criticized above, no systematic empirical evidence has been 
provided on the other potential adverse effects of advance notice that 
opponents have enumerated. 
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While at first glance, this discussion suggests that federal!'/ 
mandated advance notice for displaced workers may be an idea whose time 
has come, several cautions are In order. First, the effects of voluntary 
provision of advance notice in situations where workers expect impending 
displacement anyway may be very different from the effects of mandated 
advance notice in situations where the impending displacement Is 
completely unexpected by workers.6 2ndeed, one should recall that the 
SDW, which our research and most of the research we surveyed was based 
upon, asked only if workers received advance notice 2£ expected their 
displacement. 
Future researchers will have access to the January 1988 Survey of 
Displaced Workers which specifically asks displaced workers if they 
received formal advance notice and, if so, how long the notice was. 
However, even with these data, to adequately estimate the effects of 
advance notice per se will require researchers to try to model what 
displaced workers' expectations of displacement would have been in the 
absence of advance notice. Put another way, researchers need to estimate 
if forma! advance notice actually conmunicates new information to workers. 
Second, the observation that the voluntary provision of advance 
notice appears to reduce the probability a displaced worker will suffer 
any spell of nonemployroent does not necessarily imply that mandated 
advance notice will increase employment and decrease unemployment rates. 
Indeed, one can conceive of situations in which displaced workers compete 
for * fixed number of vacant positions that only a fraction of them can 
obtain. Advance notice gives those workers who receive notice an 
advantage; it increases their probability of finding one of these jobs 
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prior to displacement. However, if the number of vacant positions is 
truly fixed, by necessity the probability that workers who failed to 
receive notice find jobs would have to go down. In this case, the gains 
"to those workers who received notice would come solely at the expense of 
those workers who failed to receive notice. There would be no social 
gains from advance notice in the sense that, on average, it would not 
influence aggregate employment levels and/or unemployment rates. 
Studies that use individual-based data sets, such as our own and the 
others that used the £DW. can not test for the possibility of such 
displacement effects. The only study of U.S. data that addressed this 
issue, Folbre, Leighton and Roderick C1984) did find evidence that 
voluntary provision of advance notice led to smaller temporary increases 
in area unemployment rates. However, Lazear's (198?) cross-country study 
found no significant effects of mandated advance notice on national 
tmployment levels and unemployment rates. Cieariy more studies that focus 
on the affects of advance notice on area economic outcomes are needed. 
Suppose for a moment, however, that all voluntarily provided advance 
notice actually does is "reshuffle* jobs among displaced workers from 
those people who fail to receive notice to those people who do receive it. 
In fact, evidence of this might strengthen the case for government 
mandated advance notice if the people who receive notice voluntarily are 
the ones least in need of such assistance. For example, H high wage 
unionized workers were more likely to receive notict than comparably 
skilled lower wage nonunion workers, implementation of federal legislation 
would allow the latter a "better shot" at competing with the former for 
the available jobs when they are displaced.7 one thus might be in favor 
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of advance notice legislation because of its potential redlstrlbutlve 
affects, even if one believes it will have no net affect on employment or 
^unemployment. 
Ultimately, given all the evidence presented and cited above, the 
position one takes towards advance notice legislation will depend heavily 
on one's preconceptions as to hoy labor markets function. If one believes 
labor markets in the main are competitive and operate primarily in an 
efficient manner, one might argue that the onus is on those who propose 
government intervention to document empirically what the benefits of the 
proposed legislation are and to document that its adverse side effects 
will be small. Given such a view, one might argue that the evidence 
presented here does not support government Intervention: there are too 
many results whose implications are ambiguous and too many yet unanswered 
quest i ons, 
If, on the other hand, one believes that labor markets in the main 
are not competitive and/or that important externalities exist when workers 
are displaced, one will find the results presented here very supportive of 
some form of intervention, perhaps in the form of advance notice 
legislation. Such individuals may claim that we have documented at least 
sane private benefits that advance notice seems to produce, without 
uncovering any evidence of its costs. 
It is Important when designing an intervention, however, to be clear 
about the source of public concern. If the major concern Ss the 
externality imposed on a local community due to a plant closing or large 
scale layoff, then public policy should specifically address this concern. 
Such a concern may argue for advance notice legislation. However, in this 
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case, exemptions based on absolute size, including current proposals, do not 
address this problem as well as exemptions based on size relative to the 
local labor market, In contrast, if the source of concern is the private 
costs workers suffer from displacement, then severance pay provisions may 
be a viable alternative and/or addition to advance notice legislation. 
We conclude from the existing evidence that the social costs of worker 
displacement would be substantially reduced by a federal policy relating to 
advance notice. There are several policy options. Tne federal government 
could reduce the costs to firms of providing such notice by funding a share 
of the unemployment benefits received by notified workers and/or by reducing 
the firms' income tax rates. 
Another alternative is experimental adoption of federal legislation 
that provides for advance notice of plant closings or permanent layoffs. 
Weil-designed research during the experimental period could be used to 
more adequately address issues relating to the macro labor market effects 
of the legislation, including whether advance notice of impending displace-
ment can serve to help prevent displacement from occurring, as proponents 
of the legislation often assert. Since so much of prior research has 
focused on the potential benefits of advance notice legislation, studies 
during the experimental period might also profitably seriously research 
issues that opponents have been concerned about, relating to the costs of 
the legislation. 
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Isainslss. 
i. In what follows often we use "plant closing" as a shorthand for 
•plant closing and/or large scale layoff*. During the 1979-1983 period, 
approximately 49 percent of permanently displaced workers were displaced 
due to plant closings (see Flair, and Sehga! (1985) for example), 
2. If workers are displaced, the maintenance of health insurance 
provide needed service for individuals during a period when stress leads 
to increased incidence of physical and mental ailments. Payments by firms 
to the communities In which shut plants were located would help alleviate 
the extra demands placed on these communities for aocia! services that-the 
shutdowns cause; demands that would arise at the same time that local 
property and sales tax revenue were being reduced. 
3. This line of reasoning suggests that the case for mandated 
advance notice is stronger when the displaced workers represent a large 
share of the local labor force. The displacement of 100 workers in a 
relatively small community is likely to represent much more of an 
externality than a similar size displacement In a large city. Somewhat 
surprisingly, neither existing nor proposed legislation takes this into 
account. 
4. The SM data do not permit us to differentiate multiple spells of 
noneroployment, nor to distinguish between unemployment and nonpartlci-
pation. Our conclusions therefore apply to total noneraployment time from 
the date of displacement to the survey date. 
5. Swaim and Podgursky C1988) reach a similar conclusion in recent 
research that uses data from both the Sffi and a similar supplement that 
was part of the January 1986 £uxJ£JOLL^omlALLfin_Suxv££. Their paper cites 
20 -, • 
an earlier version of our paper. 
6. We are grateful to Sherwin Sosen for stressing this point to us, 
7. See Ehrenberg and Jakubson (forthcoming) for evidence that 
displaced unionized workers are more likely to receive advance notice than 
displaced nonunion workers. 
